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Abstract. Play behaviour is notorious for constituting a much debated, yet little 
clarified field of research. In this article, attempts are made to reach conclusions 
on the relation between human play and the play of other animals (especially cat 
play), as well as on the very character of play. The concept of Umwelt is reviewed, 
as are definitions of animal play, categorization of animal play and the role of 
meta-communication in playful behaviour. For some, play is a symbol of every-
thing that is good. The author of the current article does not deny that social 
morality may have originated from play behaviour, but stresses the existence of 
cruelty play, which leads to additional assumptions. Another notion that is treated 
in some detail is perceptual play, which proves to demonstrate complex semiotic 
play that is related first of all to signification. At the end of the article an 
alternative categorization of animal play is suggested, in which the fundamental 
role of mind games is emphasized. Throughout the text, examples of play 
behaviour are offered by the two domestic cats Muki and Maluca. 
 
 
                                                 
1  I dedicate the article to Maluca, that crazy cat we left behind at our land in 
Brazil, and deep ecologist Arne Næss (1913–2009), a philosopher who was playing 
until his last day. 
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The fun of playing resists all analysis, all logical interpretation […] Here we 
have to do with an absolutely primary category of life, familiar to everybody 
at a glance right down to the animal level […] Animals play so they must be 
more than merely mechanical things. We play and know that we play,  
so we must be more than merely rational beings. 
Huizinga 1986[1938]: 3–4. 
 
Starring in this article are two female domestic cats (Felis catus) — 
Muki (2005–) and Maluca (2007/2008–), who have their homes in 
Tartu, Estonia and Magé-RJ, Brazil respectively. While Muki was a 
young adult at the time of these observations, Maluca was at first a 
kitten, achieving sexual maturity — to much excitement — only at the 
end of this informal study period. As Darwin (1875: 165) theorized, 
within “the same country we do not meet with distinct races of the cat 
[…] from their nocturnal and rambling habits, indiscriminate crossing 
cannot without much trouble be prevented”. Despite living in different 
environments and under different climatic conditions, Muki and 
Maluca exhibit some common traits with respect to playing, to which I 
will return in the course of this small expose. They both display unique 
personalities. This is testimony to the fact that cats, like dogs, their 
“rival companion animal in our affections” (Sebeok 2001: 91; cf. Se-
beok 1994), appear to be among the most adaptable animals on Earth. 
As Sebeok (2001: 192) pointed out “a cat, by virtue of being as-
signed a personal name, can be dragged, if only to a degree, through 
the periphery of and into our Umwelt”. Maluca, which means ‘crazy 
(female)’ in Portuguese, learnt to obey her name, to the point of 
noticing when we talked about her. In another context Sebeok (1990: 
77, cf. Sebeok 1981) hypothesized that social cooperation involved in 
play is a prerequisite for bearing “a singular proper name (SPN), 
marking each carrier animal as unique”. Vertebrates which are capable 
of individual recognition, according to Sebeok’s hypothesis, “tend to 
play as well, and vice versa”. He speculated that future probing would 
reveal that fishes play. As it happens, Gordon M. Burghardt, in his The 
Genesis of Animal Play (2006) — a book in which the author searches 
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for play in animals that are rarely thought to play — devotes a dozen 
pages to fishy play. According to Sebeok (1990: 92), natural SPNs 
“occur in those vertebrates which form personal societies” and “tend 
to be found in the phylum Chordata, typically in vertebrates, and, with 
increasing frequency, in birds and mammals”. 
Play behaviour is notorious for constituting a much debated, yet 
little clarified field of research. In the words of Burghardt (2006: 6), 
serious scholars “typically ignore play; the exceptions also find them-
selves ignored”. All told, the phenomenon of play has not been 
“effectively confronted in science or society. Yet it may lie at the core 
of who we are and how we came to be” (Burghardt 2006: xiv). In the 
interpretation of Simonović and Simonović (2007: 6), “the develop-
ment of creative powers [...] became the basis for the ‘detachment’ of 
man from nature and for setting up an active (change-aspiring) 
relationship with nature”. Kaplan and Kaplan (1982: 93), however, 
conclude that this power to initiate change is a much more widespread 
capacity. 
 
Familiarity, the outcome of exploration, is also the starting point for 
play. [...] It is as if the identity of the elements was achieved through 
exploration and the way the elements can be arranged and rearranged is 
achieved through play. [...] With increasing familiarity, the mental 
entities become increasingly compact, increasingly discrete, and 
increasingly responsive to activation in the absence of what they 
represent. They become, in a word, manipulable. 
 
If civilization has its roots in playful behaviour, as many have sug-
gested, then certainly this adds up to yet another reason to study 
animal play, since whatever explains, or helps understand, phenomena 
of major interest (such as civilization, and fun) is itself of major 
interest. Yes, let us not neglect this most trivial and nevertheless most 
imperative finding about play: “When animals play they are having 
fun” (Bekoff 2004: 837). 
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Playful Umwelten 
 
The practice of playing appears to be so fundamental for the wellbeing 
of many social animals — at least at certain stages and in certain 
moments of life — that to deprive an animal of the chances to play can 
be tantamount to denying it a good life. Homo ludens, our own kind, 
might perhaps be characterized by playful sexuality, to the effect that 
an absence of playfulness in this region of adult life in many cultures 
comes to signify a dull and mind-numbing reality. 
Contrary to the claim of Simonović and Simonović (2007: 6), my 
view is that there is indeed a continuity of animal play in the play of 
man. “Through playing,” they assert, “man does not confirm his 
animal nature, but his human nature — becomes man (unique perso-
nality), while the animal through “playing” becomes an animal (a 
member of the species)”. Alternatively we could establish that man 
does have an animal nature — which is our general nature, and a 
human nature, which is our specific nature. Interspecific play probably 
tends to confirm, or trigger, our animal nature, and some intraspecific 
games of an ‘animal character’ might very well prove to do so as well. 
The kind of playing that shapes a human being as a human being, then 
(imagine a child deprived of any chance to play), is not necessarily 
characterized by being intraspecific, human play instead of inter-
specific play. Rather, it must somehow be distinguished by a uniquely 
human quality accompanying the game at hand. While this ‘human 
element’ of play is likely to rely on abstraction as well as empathy, I 
intend to demonstrate, throughout this article, that neither of these 
two abilities is found in human play only. It is reasonable to assume 
that it is the human capacity for language, thought and communi-
cation that takes abstraction as well as empathy to new heights. 
Though I do not want to play down the importance of children’s play 
with other children, I therefore tentatively establish that what charac-
terizes human play is not so much who you are playing with as how 
you play with them. 
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Almost all mammals who have been studied engage in play, 
according to Bekoff 2004 — where Bekoff writes that even reptiles, 
amphibians and (in accordance with Burghardt 2006) fish might be 
playing. Burghardt adds certain social insects, such as honeybees, to 
the list. As for birds, play has been described in about half of the avian 
orders (Sears Funk 2004). 
A special controversy in the history of play research concerns the 
function of play — or, the straightforward question: Why do we play? 
A classical answer is provided by Huizinga: 
 
Nature, so our reasoning mind tells us, could just as easily have given 
her children all those useful functions of discharging superabundant 
energy, of relaxing after exertion, of training for the demands of life, of 
compensating for unfulfilled longings, etc., in the form of purely 
mechanical exercises and reactions. But no, she gave us play, with its 
tension, its mirth and its fun. (Huizinga 1986[1938]: 3–4) 
 
The problem modern ethology has with explaining performance of 
play behaviour derives from the fact that it is, as Burghardt (2006: 71–
78) phrases it, not fully functional in the form or context in which it is 
expressed. Put bluntly, it doesn’t contribute to survival. Due to playing, 
animals risk injuries, and they use a lot of energy. So why do they do 
it? Rather than acknowledging that animal life is not all about survival, 
modern ethology tends to search for positive, lasting functions of 
playful behaviour, not least effects on socialization and cognitive 
development. A more comprehensive explanation would add that 
when primary needs (related to survival) are met, secondary needs 
(related to well-being) call for attention. This simple observation goes 
well along with the fact that this behaviour, which is performed with 
more energy than purpose, typically occurs when an animal is at ease. 
As for “compensating for unfulfilled longings”, the craving and 
yearning implicated in play — which Burghardt refers to as ‘sponta-
neous’, ‘voluntary’, ‘intentional’, ‘pleasurable’, ‘rewarding’, ‘rein-
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forcing’ — at least points to the apparent fact that the will of the 
animal is engaged in playful behaviour. 
The classical ethologist Niko Tinbergen, in the words of Burghardt 
(2006: 13), “left out one group of phenomena in his four aims: the 
emotional, experiential, or phenomenological aspects of behavior” (cf. 
Tinbergen 1963, Burghardt 1997). In Social is emotional, Mette Mi-
riam Rakel Böll (2008) investigates social play behaviour in canids. 
Pointing to the explanatory gaps in present ethology, she observes 
(Böll 2008: 332) that “[w]ithout a concept of meaning, it has proven 
difficult to explain and to define social play behavior within the terms 
of traditional biology”. The study of play, she alleges (Böll 2008: 344), 
turns into “a phenomenology of the moving body, especially when the 
behavior is meta-communicative which is the case with the play 
signals” (such as the play bow of canids). “When an individual is 
constantly confronted with ‘the other’ in social encounters,” she notes, 
as is typical of playful, social Umwelten, “a reflection of ‘my behavior’ 
is necessary. Such reflections are the felt emotions” (Böll 2008: 344) 
The emotional repertoire at play in play surely ranges from the inti-
macy of “both knowing this is a game” via the human taboos of 
playing with your food or “playing with yourself” to the delightful 
disobedience entailed in Maluca’s habit of lying down on top of a tiny 
bush we had planted in front of our house (the clearer we signaled that 
she wasn’t allowed to, the more eagerly she repeated this behaviour). 
Sebeok did a great job enunciating the concept of Umwelt as a 
“matchless world of significances [...] to which [a living being’s] 
behavior must accommodate” (Sebeok 2001: 74) — “its sealed-off, 
private monadic model of the universe” (ibid., 79) — the taxonomy 
that any living entity superimposes upon its universe in order to filter 
out otherwise unmanageable environmental noise (ibid., 89). These 
three descriptions all derive from his article What do we know about 
signifying behavior in the domestic cat (Felis catus)? (Sebeok 1994), and 
represent but fragments of his manifold variations over Uexküll’s 
Umwelt theme. His greatest contribution as well as his more counter-
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productive emphasis on the supposedly necessarily species-specific 
character of an Umwelt are enveloped in another quote (Sebeok 1992, 
cf. 2001: 124), in which Sebeok defines an Umwelt as “the ‘model’ of a 
species-specific segment of individual reality”. While the description 
of an Umwelt as a modelling system has proven to be highly fruitful, 
the second claim has proven to be simplifying in a misleading manner. 
How many worlds are there? How many spheres within spheres — 
how many thresholds above thresholds? “[I]n the phylum Chordata 
alone — to which the genus Felis belongs — there are at least forty-five 
thousand known species and hence no fewer corresponding systems of 
communication”, Sebeok (2001: 194) states, thereby offering yet 
another description of an Umwelt. But don’t populations and the like, 
as well, constitute systems of communication? In reality, the phylum 
Chordata entails far more than forty-five thousand different Um-
welten. There are species-specific Umwelten (such as the human Um-
welt) and more local Umwelten (such as the human/cultural Umwelt 
of Rio de Janeiro, the Carioca Umwelt), as well as more global Um-
welten (such as the Umwelten of primates). An Umwelt is a shared, 
public sphere, an arena for signs that make sense to a certain group of 
Umwelt participants. Umwelten are not species-specific (nor 
individual-specific — that’s the Innenwelt), but rather organism-spe-
cific. In categorizing Umwelten the threshold of the species is indeed 
useful — and it is certainly characteristic of intraspecific commu-
nication — but the threshold of the species is nevertheless but one 
threshold among many. To say that Umwelten are species-specific is 
therefore in part arbitrary. Said unconditionally such statements are 
misleading, bordering on false. 
According to Uexküll (1928: 181; my translation), the aggregate 
Umwelt of an entire species is “larger and richer than the Umwelt of 
each [member of that species]”. Species, in other words, are not totally 
homogeneous — there is always a certain intraspecific variety in 
behaviour and phenomena. This behavioural and phenomenological 
repertoire — which any species put on show — is partly due to diffe-
 Abstraction, cruelty and other aspects of animal play  565 
rences in constitution among the organisms of the species, and partly 
owing to different life histories (cf. Uexküll’s concept of an Umwelt-
tunnel). Individuality, that is to say, has its roots in physiology as well 
as in the concrete situations, or contexts, in which a living being finds 
itself immersed, and through which it has taken form not as a general 
being, but as an actual, particular being. 
As for Maluca — an individual indeed — she discriminated 
between me and my wife by tending to lick my hands and fingers, and 
bite hers — with equal commitment. For some reason my fingers 
didn’t automatically qualify as play things, even though they were 
clearly recognized as cat things — while on the other hand (sic) the 
fingers of my wife, in Maluca’s Umwelt, represented an enduring 
biting-quality, and thus acted as a limitless source of obsessive play. 
Other prominent play things in her world included beetles, birds, 
butterflies and other insects (banana flies, dragonflies, mosquitoes), 
feet and toes, flowers, frogs, leaves (cacao, cactus, mango), lizards, 
millipedes, nails, pens, plastic bags, screws and screwdrivers, seeds, 
shoes and snakes. All told: Anything she could catch, chase, bite, or 
move around, especially if the eligible play things somehow resisted, 
made sounds, or moved in unpredictable ways. It is a peculiar fact that 
Maluca never, during the study period, was observed to be playing 
with other cats, nor with mice — despite the fact that she was face-to-
face with a mouse at two occasions (in both cases, a mouse was found 
in our swimming pool, holding on for its dear life). While mice 
appeared not to be recognized as play things, other cats were simply 
not attractive in Maluca’s eyes (not, that is, until her sexual 
awakening) — a social reality that was probably owing to the fact that 
she appears to have been abandoned by her original human caretakers 
early on, and lived in unwelcoming semi-wild circumstances for some 
time thereafter. 
In short, play things are attractive (eye-catching) Umwelt objects 
(or situations) which we can, without being extraordinarily informa-
tive as for now, characterize as having a playing-quality, that is, 
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Umwelt objects (or Umwelt circumstances) somehow inviting to play. 
But what is play, anyhow? 
 
 
Categorization of animal play (Imitation of life) 
 
In the remainder of this article I will make use of three everyday terms: 
Player (a subject of play — an animal that plays), playmate (an animal 
involved in the play of a player, whether or not the playmate is itself a 
player) and toy (an object of play — something that is being played 
with by a player). There are many ways to categorize animal play. 
Some set out by distinguishing between social and non-social play, 
and therefore refer to social play and object play (or instrumental play). 
Following this line of thought we can further distinguish, within social 
play, between intraspecific and interspecific play. Partly overlapping 
with this classification is an alternative distinction, between social play 
and individual play, where individual play can be either object play or 
somehow involve playing with one self devoid of any toy (or play in 
which the player itself represents or provides the toy (say, a dog or a 
cat chasing its tail, which is always at hand — or at claw, as it were). 
Partly overlapping with this taxonomy, there are further a number of 
concepts derived from the kind of physical or sensory activity the 
player is indulged in, such as kinetic play, locomotor play and vocal 
play. Finally there are concepts in use that are derived from the kind of 
behaviour which the playful acts are supposedly imitating — such as 
aggressive play, predatory play and sexual play. 
According to Gregory Bateson (1955; cf. 2000: 181) 
 
play is a phenomenon in which the actions of “play” are related to, or 
denote, other actions of “not play”. We therefore meet in play with an 
instance of signals standing for other events, and it appears, therefore, 
that the evolution of play may have been an important step in the 
evolution of communication. 
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For Bateson (2002: 116), play is best defined as a way of organizing 
simple actions.  
 
What is characteristic of “play” is that this is a name for the contexts in 
which the constituent acts have a different sort of relevance and 
organization from that which they would have had in non-play. It may 
even be that the essence of play lies in a partial denial of the meanings 
that the actions would have had in other situations. 
 
Play, then, might be something as self-contradictory as a positively-
minded negation expressed in the language of behaviour. In a similar 
vein Dario Martinelli (2007: 76–77) observes that play, in company 
with the phenomena of lying and aesthetics, have, “in their evolution, 
achieved a certain peculiar ‘independence’ from their biological uti-
lity”. These phenomena, according to Martinelli (2007: 44), “are in a 
close semiotic relation”, as they all involve actions performed for their 
own sake, and are constitutionally related to the idea of representation 
(Martinelli 2007:  76). 
A biologist would typically, in modest compliance with the scien-
tific Zeitgeist, simply state that “when animals play they use actions 
that are used in such activities as predation (hunting), reproduction 
(mating), and aggression” (Bekoff 2004: 834). Ungulates, such as deer, 
elk, moose and gazelles, have according to Bekoff been observed run-
ning about in unpredictable zig-zag patterns during play, apparently 
imitating typical anti-predatory behaviour. Play, in the words of 
Gordon Burghardt (2006),  
 
differs from the ‘serious’ performance of ethnotypic behavior struc-
turally or temporally in at least one aspect: it is incomplete (generally 
through inhibited or dropped final elements), exaggerated, awkward, or 
precocious; or it involves behavior patterns with modified form, 
sequencing, or targeting. 
 
Both Muki and Maluca engaged in various ‘hit and run’ attacks where 
the point seemed to be not so much to carry out — or even mimic — a 
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full-scale attack as to allude to its very possibility. Maluca was 
particularly fond of the preparatory stages of this game, during which 
she would be lurking behind corners, or hiding on a step in the stairs. 
The final act of this play would boil down to a hasty, yet harmless 
touch of a claw — though with lots of motion, and a crowd-pleasing 
theatrical effect. 
 
 
Perceptual play (and meta-communication) 
 
Social play often involves the playing out of an unconventional set of 
social norms. Taken as a tendency, or pattern, this fact allows us to 
observe that play behaviour is at least at times — if not as such — a 
contra-factual activity. In the case of social, aggressive play where 
existing roles of dominance and submission are reversed, the 
foundation of the game in play appears to be translatable to the 
question: “What if ... the social rules/roles were different?” 
Assertions that there is an unbridgeable gap between human and 
animal behaviour in general and between human and animal play 
behaviour in particular are often met with references to meta-
messages and meta-communication, which are easily traceable in 
animal play. I will get back to that. The best examples I have observed 
of complex play-related abilities, however, are not examples of social 
play, where meta-messages and meta-communication are to be found. 
Instead, they belong to a category we can call perceptual play (a notion 
that is to some extent in use already). In these two examples, Muki and 
Maluca had fun anticipating the movements of a ray of light (from a 
torch) and a stream of water (from a garden hose), respectively. In 
both cases — especially with Muki and the torch — the human 
playmate occasionally attempted to “catch”, or hit, the cat’s tail with 
the light or the water, whereas Muki and Maluca were busy trying to 
catch the ray of light and the flow of water (as it hit the ground) with 
their claws. What kind of game was this, from their point of view? 
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Importantly, both cats were — in my interpretation — able to 
distinguish between a solid, physical object — a cat thing that you can 
snatch with your claws — and a ray of light, or flow of water, which 
can not be taken hold of. My interpretation is that the cats, in both 
cases, were playing that the light, or the water, was in fact a solid object, 
or more precisely: something that they could catch with their claws. 
The object of their play, in other words, was in a sense the very notion 
of solidity. By pretending that the ray of light and the stream of water 
were in fact solid objects, Muki and Maluca came across a perceptual 
game that allowed them to chase their phantom toys until exhaustion 
(either of the cats or, more often, of their human playmates), since no 
final victory was ever within reach. 
Admittedly, there are many ways to gainsay my argument. But as 
Böll (2008: 334) puts it: 
 
It appears to be both a more simple and a more plausible explanation 
that the animals are aware, i.e. that they, to varying extent, know (in a 
non-language concept of knowledge, that is) what they are doing when 
they are playing, than it is to claim that a complex series of stimulus–
responses is taking place, or that what goes on are pure actions of 
instinct. 
 
One could claim that to be playing is first of all to exhibit a playful 
(embodied) mind — and as I would like to establish, it is conceivable 
that all acts of play (even social play) start out as mind games (how 
else would they carry out the transition from the Innenwelt to the 
Umwelt?). In my interpretation, these two examples go against 
Simonović and Simonović’s claim (2007: 6) that human play, unlike 
animal play, “tends towards creation of new worlds”, while the play of 
other animals simply represents a reproduction of ‘the natural 
exigency’. My point is of course not that human play can not be 
world-creating — it obviously can, and many an innovation has 
started out as a game, a tale, or a joke — but rather that the “visionary 
disposition” (same page) of play is not distinctively human, but on the 
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contrary rooted in pre-human (and more-than-human) play. This 
creativity might very well represent not only ‘the highest point of 
humanness’, but furthermore a remarkable novelty of animality in a 
wider sense. 
The examples of the torch play and the hose play further contradict 
John Deely’s sharp distinction between objects and things (cf., for 
example, Deely 2004) — or, more precisely, his assertion that only 
humans, qua semiotic animals, are capable of distinguishing between 
objects and things (for that to be the case, he would have to rely more 
heavily on the linguistic aspect of human perception and reasoning). 
In my two examples, Muki and Maluca are both capable of dis-
tinguishing between existing (‘visible’) and imagined (‘solid’) qualities. 
It would not be reasonable to assert that the two cats simply confuse 
the appearance of something ‘visible’ with something ‘solid’, since 
such confusion would not lead to all that exaltation. No — they play 
that what is visible is also solid, all the while being perfectly aware that 
that is not actually the case. That’s the game. By playing that things are 
not what they seem, Muki and Maluca display a semiotic intelligence 
by means of which they relate to Umwelt objects in a highly complex 
manner. Their percepts function not only as simple objects of per-
ception, but further point to something which they are aware is the 
way it is regardless of the cats’ inability to seize it. 
Yet again one of Bateson’s concise wordings (1954, cf. 2000: 178) 
comes to mind. 
 
If we speculate about the evolution of communication, it is evident that 
a very important stage in this evolution occurs when the organism 
gradually ceases to respond quite ‘automatically’ to the mood-signs of 
another and becomes able to recognize the sign as a signal: that is, to 
recognize that the other individual’s and its own signals are only signals, 
which can be trusted, distrusted, falsified, denied, amplified, corrected, 
and so forth[.] 
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In the case of Muki’s torch play and Maluca’s hose play, the commu-
nication between player and playmate is beside the point, as is the fact 
that, assisted by a human playmate, the cats engage in social play. The 
mind game taking place in the Innenwelten of these two cats is what is 
at stake here. Perceptual play of this kind therefore provides further 
evidence — adding to Bateson’s evidence pertaining to meta-
messages — that some animals can make truly semiotic (not merely 
semiosic) distinctions. Bateson (1954, cf. 2000: 177–178) differentiates 
between meta-linguistic messages (about language) and meta-commu-
nicative messages (about the relationship between the ones who 
communicate), and takes the meta-message ‘This is play’ to constitute 
a self-referential paradox. The function of play signals, or play markers, 
is to invite to play, and to avoid misunderstandings during play, not 
least by assuring that the game is still on. In the words of Bekoff (2004: 
838) there is a need, during play, to “tell others, ‘I want to play with 
you’, ‘this is still play no matter what I am going to do to you’, or ‘this 
is still play regardless of what I just did to you’”. One way to signal a 
sustained play intention is to punctuate play sequences with these 
conventional actions. 
Important as the meta-communicative aspect of certain kinds of play 
is, it is, as I have demonstrated by my two examples of perceptual play, 
not the only variety of semiotically complex play behaviour (as Muki 
was playing with a toy mouse, her swelling boredom as the toy mouse 
did not respond to her play signals easily killed her curiosity). What a 
study of perceptual play can bring about is new perspectives on the 
Innenwelt of players — the mind game aspect of play. What we animals 
can play with is evidently not restricted to the rules of social reality — it 
also extends to the rules of perceptual (and, as we shall se, sensory) 
reality, as well as, in the case of humans, linguistic reality. The meta-
communicative aspect of social play is nevertheless sufficient to refute 
Paul Bouissac’s false allegation (2004: 3396) that “the very notion of true, 
symmetrical interspecific communication remains a theoretical one as 
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long as Homo sapiens is not given an opportunity of interacting with 
another species endowed with meta-communicative competence”. 
 
 
Cruelty play  
(Play as a symbol of everything that is good) 
 
Bateson’s personal interest in the abstract problem of play originated 
from his desire to inquire into the ways in which organisms loosen up 
on the rules of communication. “They play with these structures or 
rules and thereby move forward to new rules, new philosophies, etc” 
(quoted in Sebeok 1990: 86). He held that human imagination and 
healing derive from play. Encyclopedia of Animal Behavior (Bekoff 
(ed.) 2004) in its turn lists trusting, niceness, fairness, forgiving, apo-
logizing and justice among the norms of social play. As for honesty, 
Bekoff (2004: 839) notes that “[p]lay signals are rarely used to deceive 
others. [...] Cheaters are unlikely to be chosen as play partners because 
others can simply refuse to play with them and can choose others”. 
Since social play cannot occur in the absence of cooperation or 
fairness, he suggests it might be a ‘foundation of fairness’. “Even in 
rats, fairness and trust are important in the dynamics of playful 
interactions” (Bekoff 2004: 839). By playing, we are told, individuals 
learn what is right and wrong — what is acceptable to others, and how 
conflicts can be resolved. This symmetry, or egalitarianism “needed 
for play [...] is thought to be a precondition for the evolution of social 
morality in humans” (Bekoff 2004: 844). 
While I admit that most of the above holds true for most instances 
of social play, I would like to direct attention toward cruelty play, for 
which hardly any of the abovementioned statements are valid. 
Reiterating the list of Maluca’s play things, it comes into sight that a 
majority of them were living beings, and yet — none of them, except 
me and my wife, were her consenting playmates. The rest were rather 
toys. Here, in other words, we encounter a kind of play in which 
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resistant ‘playmates’ are subdued and objectified; in which playmates 
are treated as toys. The object of cruelty play may or may not be aware 
of the playful character of its torture. The latter was probably the case 
for the snake Maluca bit the head and tale off, after it was sufficiently 
weakened by repeated bites and could no longer hide its frontal side 
for her teeth. For Maluca’s part the fun was over when it stopped 
moving (whereas her keenness was unambiguous as long as there was 
still a scent of danger in the air). Death is surely a sad thing. 
In the case of cruelty play, what is for the player a comedy is a 
tragedy for the playmate — quite likely a struggle for life, until death. 
Often, but not always, the playmate ends up being eaten, or eaten 
upon (the human taboo of playing with your food has little sway in the 
world of cats). Unlike Maluca, Muki did, in fact, on a couple of occa-
sions, catch a mouse, and her strategy was classical: Trying to keep the 
mouse alive as long as practically possible, by use of what is in social 
play called ‘self-handicapping’, or ‘role-reversing’. This entails that a 
dominant animal performs uncharacteristically submissive or comp-
liant actions during play. In Muki’s play with the mouse, the effect of 
her self-handicapping was, from the mouse’s point of view, simply to 
prolong the torture. Notably, Muki’s self-handicapping was more 
significant during her play with a real mouse than when she played 
with a toy mouse. If that observation is to serve as a general guideline, 
it appears that object play in its proper sense (where the object of play 
is indeed an object, rather than an objectified playmate) is more 
exaggerated than cruelty play. Judging on the basis of Maluca’s various 
encounters, self-handicapping on the other hand seems to be stronger 
the weaker the objectified playmate is. 
The existence of cruelty play proves Bekoff (2004: 839) wrong 
when he claims that “‘[u]ncooperative play’ is in fact impossible”. 
Cruelty play is exactly forced play — in which the playmate is an 
object, rather than a subject of play. In cruelty play, there is no break-
down in dominance relationships, except as mockery. While social 
play proper — play among consenting players — can be said to be 
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symmetrical, cruelty play represents a highly asymmetrical kind of 
play, in which the rules are dictated by one party. Against all of this, 
some will argue that the cat’s play with a mouse does not qualify as 
play, since they are not both playing — or, that the cat is simply 
playing with an object. To that I can only retort first that wherever 
there is a player in action, there is play, and second that it should in-
deed make a difference whether the object of play is animate or inani-
mate (though the cruelty player resolves that question by reducing the 
animate to something inanimate). What is intriguing with cruelty play 
is exactly its conflation of social play and object play. As such, it could 
alternatively be branded as asocial play. Originating as a sadistic mind 
game, and then put into life, it constitutes a sort of behaviour in which 
communicative signals are ignored by the player, who focuses on re-
joicing in anticipated signification. 
 
 
The politics of play  
(Categorization of animal play revisited) 
 
For Simonović and Simonović (2007: 1), freedom is the essence of play, 
or more precisely of libertarian play, which serves as the foundation of 
civilization. They further write (Simonović and Simonović 2007: 6): 
 
While creating a civilization, man has not developed his own playing 
nature ‘inherited from animals’, but has developed his own specific 
playing being which continuously ‘breaks through’ the limits imposed 
on him, in the form of an established ‘play’, by the ruling order. 
 
If there is something to what I have argued against Simonović and 
Simonović earlier in this article, then it appears that we here witness 
yet another denial of our animal roots (so to speak); of our rooting in 
nature — yet another mind game carried out as if it was not a game at 
all. Contrary to these views, Bateson (1954, cf. 2000: 179) held that as 
soon as organisms in play, “having eaten of the fruit of the Tree of 
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Knowledge, discover that their signals are signals”, language and all 
the complexities of empathy, identification and so on could follow. 
All that is very well. What I want to emphasize is that if play is the 
cradle of civilization, of cooperation and of social morality, then it is 
likely also to have been the cradle of war, of relentless ambition and of 
our gradual sophistication of violence. Play is a phenomenon that 
occurs in countless circumstances, and it would be naive to think that 
it has an intrinsic value (in human terms) in all its manifestations. 
Returning to the definition and categorization of play, it now ap-
pears that much of what is generally said about play as such is in fact 
valid only for social play proper, that is, play among players. Play as 
such is not necessarily a voluntary, egalitarian activity. Nor is it neces-
sarily an imitation of ‘real-life activities’ (is cruelty play serious or non-
serious behaviour?). As is evident with regard both to perceptual play 
and to cruelty play, nor, indeed, does it necessarily involve meta-com-
munication. If there is one thing all play behaviour has in common, in 
addition to the fact that all players have fun, it is the fact that all play 
starts with a mind game (for which the object of play can be said to be 
the privacy of perception). Even communicative play, in other words, 
starts out as anticipated signification. 
One way to deal with the troubled categorization of animal play 
would be to start categorizing anew. Playing such a mind game, I 
would suggest the following (admittedly incomplete) categorization: 
 
CATEGORY OF PLAY PREDOMINANTLY... OBJECT OF PLAY_____   
Role play Iconic Behavioural/social roles 
Sensational play Indexical Pleasure of sensation 
Perceptual play Symbolic Rules of perception __ 
 
Here, further distinctions between social play vs. solitary play, and 
symmetrical/consented play vs. asymmetrical/forced play could be 
made within each of the three categories. Like cruelty play, sensational 
play (sensory play, or elemental play) would not in all cases fit with 
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today’s orthodoxy concerning play’s alleged simulation of ‘real-life’ 
activities (and who decided play is not a ‘real-life activity’, anyway?). 
Cruelty play — part sensory delight and part perverted sociality — 
would be located on the border of sensational play and role play. 
Humans take part in all categories of play — not least in mind games, 
the imaginary anticipation of play, be it role play, sensational play or 
perceptual play. In a sense, that is what play is all about: playing 
around with the possibilities of the mind. 
As for the semiotic terms iconic, indexical and symbolic, it must be 
stressed that the different aspects of the sign may intermingle in 
various forms of play (as an example of symbolic role play, consider 
sexual fetish play). The three mentioned categories of play, as well, 
frequently intermingle (in social fetish play, role play can be explicitly 
combined not only with symbolic play, but also with sensational 
play — which is, in a vaguer sense, an intrinsic element of any kind of 
play, except — perhaps — pure mind games). Further distinctions 
could be made between semiosic play (non-semiotic play, cf. the 
following) and semiotic play (play in which the player is aware about 
the semioticality [semiotic character] of the game), and between 
communication-based and signification-based play (where the latter, 
being in a vague sense universal, in a way envelops, or supports, the 
former).2 
 
                                                 
2  This research was supported by the European Union through the European 
Regional Development Fund (Centre of Excellence CECT) and by Estonian 
Science Foundation Grant No. 7790 “Dynamical zoosemiotics and animal 
representations”.  
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Абстракция, жестокость и другие аспекты игр животных 
 
Игровое поведение славится тем, что положило начало множеству 
спорных, но до сих пор мало выясненным исследованиям. В данной 
статье рассматриваются отношения между человеческими играми и 
играми животных (особенно кошек) и предпринимается попытка 
разобраться в сущности игры как таковой. По-новому интерпрети-
руются понятие умвельта, определение игры животных, классифи-
кация игр животных и роль метакоммуникации в игровом поведе-
нии. Для некоторых игра является символом всего хорошего. Автор 
статьи не отрицает, что в игровом поведении могут скрываться на-
чала морали, но подчеркивает, что имеется и так наз. жестокая игра, 
которая приводит нас к новым выводам. Второе понятие, которое 
подробно рассматривается — игра перцепции, что представляет 
собой комплексную семиотическую игру, связанную прежде всего с 
сигнификацией. В конце статьи предлагается альтернативная класси-
фикация игр животных, где особый упор сделан на играх ума. Во 
всей статье в качестве примеров приводятся игры двух кошек — 
Муки и Малуки. 
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Abstraktsioon, julmus ja teised loomamängu aspektid  
Muki ja Maluca mängude näitel 
 
Mänguline käitumine on kuulus sellepoolest, et selle ümber on olnud 
palju vaidlusi, kuid vähe selgust. Käesolevas artiklis püütakse jõuda min-
gite järeldusteni inimeste mängu ja loomade (eriti kasside) mängu vahe-
liste suhete ning mängu enda olemuse osas. Uue tõlgenduse leiab mõiste 
omailm, aga ka mõisted loomade mäng, loomade mängu klassifikatsioon 
ja metakommunikatsiooni osa mängulises käitumises. On neid, kelle jaoks 
mäng on kõige hea sümbol. Käesoleva artikli autor ei eita, et sotsiaalse 
moraali alge võib peituda mängulises käitumises, kuid rõhutab, et on 
olemas ka nn julm mäng, mis viib meid uute järeldusteni. Teine mõiste, 
millele on pühendatud omajagu täheruumi, on tajumäng, mis tõestab 
ennekõike tähistamisega seotud keerulise semiootilise mängu olemasolu. 
Artikli lõpetuseks pakutakse välja alternatiivne loomamängu klassifikat-
sioon, kus erilist rõhku on asetatud mõttemängudele. Kogu artiklis illust-
reerivad väiteid näited kahe kodukassi, Muki ja Maluca mängudest. 
 
